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Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems reveals three major principles:
(i) proportionality (PRO), (ii) equal awards (EA), and (iii) equal losses (EL).
However, most real life bankruptcy procedures implement only the propor-
tionality principle. We construct a noncooperative investment game with se-
quential investment decisions to explore whether the explanation lies in the
alternative implications of these principles on investment behavior. Our re-
sults are as follows. First EL always induces higher total investment than
PRO which in turn induces higher total investment than EA;this is consistent
with the ndings of K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s (2010) who analyze an investment game
with simultaneous investment decisions. Second, we observe that under both
EA and EL, changing the order of moves from simultaneous to sequential ef-
fects increases total investment, independent of the identity of the rst-mover.
Finally, we also compare these principles in terms of social welfare induced in
equilibrium and have following results. A switch from PRO to EA or EL, may
decrease both egalitarian and utilitarian welfare independent of the setting
used. Moreover, a transition from a simultaneous case to a sequential case
may increase egalitarian welfare independent of the rule used. This transition
may also increase utilitarian social welfare under EA but decrease it under EL.
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SIRALI YATIRIM KARARLARI ALINAN ORTAMLARDA ·IFLAS
KURALLARININ YATIRIMCI DAVRANIS¸INA ETK·IS·I
Ays¸e Yeliz Kaçamak
Ekonomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2011
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Özgür K¬br¬s
Özet
Anahtar Kelimeler: ias, i¸sbirlikçi olmayan yat¬r¬m oyunu, orant¬sal, es¸it
kazançlar, es¸it kay¬plar.
·Ias problemlerinin aksiyomatik analizi üç ana orensibi ortaya ç¬kar¬yor: (i)
orant¬sall¬k (PRO), (ii) es¸it kazançlar (EA), ve (iii) es¸it kay¬plar (EL). Fakat
gerçek dünyadaki ias süreçlerinde sadece proportionality principle uygulan-
makta. Bu uygulamadaki sebeplerin yat¬r¬m davran¬¸s¬ndan kaynaklan¬p kay-
naklanmad¬¼g¬n¬incelemek amac¬yla i¸sbirlikçi olmayan, ard¬¸s¬k kararlar¬n al¬nd¬¼g¬
bir yat¬r¬m oyunu kuruyoruz. Elde etti¼giniz sonuçlar s¸öyle. Öncelikle EL her
zaman PROdan PRO da EAdan daha yüksek toplam yat¬r¬ma tes¸vik ediyor.
Bu bulgular es¸zamanl¬yat¬r¬m kararlar¬n¬n verildi¼gi bir yat¬r¬m oyunu analize
eden K¬br¬s ve K¬br¬s (2010)la tutarl¬d¬r. ·Ikinci olarak es¸zamanl¬bir oyundan,
s¬ral¬bir oyuna geçildi¼ginde ilk hareket eden oyuncunun kimli¼ginden ba¼g¬ms¬z
olarak, hem EA hem EL alt¬nda toplam yat¬r¬m¬art¬yor. Son olarak bu pren-
sipleri denge halinde yaratt¬klar¬ sosyal refah aç¬s¬ndan kar¸s¬las¸t¬r¬yoruz, bu
kar¸s¬las¸t¬rma sonucu elde etti¼gimiz sonuçlar s¸öyle. PROdan hem ELye hem de
EAya geçti¼gimizde, egalitaryan ve utilitaryan refahta düs¸üs¸ gözlemlenebilir.
Ek olarak es¸zamanl¬kararlar¬n al¬nd¬¼g¬bir oyundan, ard¬¸s¬k kararlar¬n al¬nd¬¼g¬
bir oyuna geçti¼gimizde, hangi kural¬n kullan¬ld¬¼g¬ndan ba¼g¬ms¬z olarak egali-
taryan refahta art¬¸s gözlemlenebilir. Bu geçi¸s EA alt¬nda, utilitaryan refahta
da art¬¸s sa¼glayabilirken, EL alt¬nda, düs¸üs¸e sebep olabilir.
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1 Introduction
Following the seminal work of ONeill (1982), a vast literature focused on the
axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems. As the name suggests, a canon-
ical example to this problem is the case of a bankrupt rm whose monetary
worth is to be allocated among its creditors. Each creditor holds a claim on
the rm and the rms liquidation value is less than the total of the credi-
torsclaims. The axiomatic literature provided a large variety of bankruptcy
rules as solutions to this problem. The most central of these rules are all
based on one (or more) of three central principles: (i) proportionality, (ii)
equal awards, and (iii) equal losses.1
Bankruptcy has also been a central topic in corporate nance where re-
searchers analyze a large number of issues related to it (e.g. see Hotchkiss et
al (2008)).2 This literature shows that, in practice almost every country uses
the following rule to allocate the liquidation value of a bankrupt rm.3 First,
creditors are sorted into di¤erent priority groups (such as secured creditors or
unsecured creditors). These groups are served sequentially. That is, a cred-
itor is not awarded a share until creditors in higher priority groups are fully
1As their names suggest, these principles suggest that the agentsshares should be chosen,
respectively, (i) proportional to their investments, (ii) so as to equate their awarded shares,
(iii) so as to equate their losses from initial investment. There are bankruptcy rules purely
based on one of these principles (such as the Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards,
Constrained Egalitarian, Constrained Equal Losses rules) as well as rules that apply di¤erent
principles on di¤erent types of problems (such as the Talmud rule which uses both equal
awards and equal losses principles).
2This is not surprising considering that in US between 1999 and 2009, more than 551000
rms led for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and more than 22.16 billion USD were allocated in
these cases (see http://www.justice.gov/ust/index.htm).
3Procedures on the liquidation of the rm and its allocation among creditors exist in
bankruptcy laws of every country. For examples, see Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code or the Receivership code in U.K. In some countries such as Sweden or Finland, these
procedures provide the only option for the resolution of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy laws of
some other countries, such as U.S., also o¤er procedures (such as Chapter 11) for reorgani-
zation of the bankrupt rm.
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reimbursed. Second, in each priority group, the shares of the creditors are
determined proportional to their claims.4
In this paper, we explore why in actual bankruptcy laws, proportionality
has been preferred over the other two principles. Our starting observation is
that alternative bankruptcy rules a¤ect the investment behavior in a country
in di¤erent ways. In a way, each rule induces a di¤erent noncooperative game
among the investors. Comparing the equilibria of these games, in terms of total
investment or social welfare, might provide us ways of comparing alternative
bankruptcy rules and thus, the principles underlying them, in a way that is
not previously considered in either the axiomatic literature or the corporate
nance literature on bankruptcy, both discussed at the end of this section.
This paper follows up on K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s (2010) who analyzes the above
question using games where the investors move simultaneously. Their analysis
is aimed to model investment situations where the investors are not informed
about the othersdecisions. This however, is not purely the case in many real
life settings. Firms going public could be a good example for a sequential
setting where big investor(s) move rst, also venture capital can be a good
example for a sequential setting where small investor(s) move rst. To analyze
such environments, in this paper we construct a game where the investment
decisions are sequential. Finally, we also use the sequential model to ask
mechanism-design type questions. More specically, we compare the equilibria
of the simultaneous and sequential versions of the investment game to see if
total investment in the economy or equilibrium social welfare can be improved
by a particular design of the order of moves.
As a representation of the proportionality principle, we use the Proportional
rule (hereafter, PRO), which assigns each investor a share proportional to his
investment. We then look at the unconstrained equal awards rule (EA)
4This is a very old and common practice, referred to as a pari passu distribution; the term
meaning proportionally, at an equal pace, without preference(see Blacks Law Dictionary,
2004).
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which always chooses equal division as a representation of the equal awards
principle. Thirdly as a representation of the equal losses principle we use the
unconstrained equal losses rule (EL) which always equates the investors
losses.
For each one of these bankruptcy rules, we construct a simple game among
2 investors who sequentially choose how much money to invest in a rm.
The total of these investments determine the value of the rm. The rm
is a lottery which either brings a positive return or goes bankrupt. In the
latter case, its liquidation value is allocated among the investors according to
the prespecied bankruptcy rule. For each bankruptcy rule, we analyze the
subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the corresponding investment game, under
sequential setting, both the cases where big investor moves rst and the cases
where small investor moves rst. (We capture this asymmetry in the agents by
allowing them to di¤er in risk aversion levels, which will be explained below)5.
We then compare these equilibria.
In our model, agents have Constant Absolute Risk Aversion preferences and
are weakly ordered according to their degrees of risk aversion. (This ordering
is without loss of generality since the agents are identical in other dimensions.)
The agents do not face liquidity constraints and thus, their income levels are
not relevant. However, as is standard in the literature, it is possible to interpret
the agentsrisk aversion levels as a decreasing function of their income levels.
(Thus, less risk averse agents can be thought of as richer, bigger investors.)
Alternatively, each agent can be taken to represent an investment fund. In
this case, the income level is irrelevant. The risk-aversion parameter attached
to each investment fund then represents the type of that fund. Since we do not
restrict possible congurations of risk aversion, this allows us to compare the
three principles in terms of how they treat di¤erent types of agents (such as big
5The characteristics of the rules are di¤erent, in the sense how they treat di¤erent agents,.
Therefore, by changing the order of moves, we try to observe how the rules treat the agents
according to their identities
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versus small investors) as well as how they react to changes in the risk-aversion
distribution.
Our analysis compares bankruptcy rules in terms of two criteria. Our rst
criterion is total equilibrium investment which is a simple measure of how
a bankruptcy rule a¤ects investment behavior in the economy. It is reasonable
to think that a government prefers bankruptcy rules that induce higher total
investment in the economy. Thus, a bankruptcy rule that induces higher total
investment than PRO might be considered a superior alternative to it. On the
other hand, it is not clear that an increase in total investment will also increase
the welfare of the investors. Thus, our second criterion is equilibrium social
welfare. Egalitarianism and utilitarianism present two competing and central
notions of measuring social welfare. We therefore compare bankruptcy rules
in terms of both egalitarian and utilitarian social welfare that they induce
in equilibrium.
Before going any further it will be benecial to describe the ndings of
K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s (2010) in more detail. Their model is similar to ours ex-
cept (i) there is an arbitrary number of agents and (ii) investment decisions
are taken simultaneously. Like us, they compare Nash equilibria of investment
games (induced by di¤erent bankruptcy rules) in terms of (i) total equilibrium
investment and (ii) equilibrium social welfare (both egalitarian and utilitar-
ian). They compare the Nash equilibria of the investment games under PRO,
EA, and EL as well as mixtures of PRO and EA and mixtures of PRO and
EL. Their main results are as follows. The investment game has a unique
Nash equilibrium for every parameter combination and for each bankruptcy
rule. These equilibria are such that, at all parameters values (i) EL induces
higher total investment than PRO which in turn induces higher total invest-
ment than EA; (ii) PRO induces higher egalitarian social welfare than both
EA and EL in interior equilibria; (iii) PRO induces higher utilitarian social
welfare than EL in interior equilibria but its relation to EA depends on the
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parameter values (however, a numerical analysis shows that on a large part of
the parameter space, PRO induces higher utilitarian social welfare than EA).
Thus, in the connes of their simple model, PRO outperforms EA in almost
every criterion. Also, switching from PRO to EL increases total investment
but decreases both egalitarian and utilitarian social welfare. The rest of the
related literature will be given at the end of the introduction section.
A summary of our main results is as follows. Independent of the order of
moves, the investment game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
every parameter combination and for each bankruptcy rule. These equilibria
exhibit the following properties. In terms of individual investment levels (i)
under EA, compared to the simultaneous-move game, both agents invest more
under the sequential setting, independent of the identity of the rst mover; (ii)
under EL, compared to the simultaneous-move game, both agents invest more
if they are the rst mover, and they invest less if they are the second mover (and
this nding is independent of their risk aversion levels); (iii) under PRO, the
order of moves has no e¤ect on the individual investment decisions. In terms
of total investment, (iv) EL does better than PRO which in turn does better
than EA; (v) independent of the order of moves, both EL and EA perform
better under sequential setting than under simultaneous setting; (vi) under
PRO; order of moves has no e¤ect on total investment.
To compare social welfare induced by rules we mostly conduct numerical
analysis. This analysis show that in terms of social welfare (vii) PRO induces
higher egalitarian social welfare than EA which in turn induces higher egali-
tarian social welfare than EL in interior equilibria independent of the setting
; (viii) Under EA when big investor is the rst mover utilitarian social wel-
fare is maximized. Both PRO and EA induce higher utilitarian social welfare
than EL in interior equilibria independent of the setting.(ix)When EA (EL)
is considered a transition from a simultaneous case to a sequential case may
increase(decrease) egalitarian and utilitarian social welfare independent of the
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order of moves.
PRO is advantageous to the other rules also in the sense that only under
PRO do the investors have dominant strategies (which are strictly dominant).
Thus, for planning purposes, the government has a stronger prediction on
investor behavior under PRO:
Finally, potential heterogeneity of the agentsrisk attitudes plays an im-
portant role in our analysis. Bankruptcy rules are very di¤erent in terms of
the incentives that they provide for big versus small investors. The equal
losses principle o¤ers relatively better protection to the bigger (i.e. less risk
averse) investors. The equal awards principle does the opposite. The pro-
portionality principle strikes a compromise by o¤ering the same proportion of
their investment to every agent. We also observe that under di¤erent rules
an agent reacts very di¤erently to changes in the othersrisk attitudes: under
EA (EL) his investment decreases (increases) as the other agents get more
risk averse; under PRO; however, his investment remains constant. This once
again makes the equilibrium prediction under PRO more reliable since under
PRO; the agents, in determining their investment strategies, need not be in-
formed about the risk-aversion (or income) prole of the other investors. A
detailed summary of our ndings as well as their possible policy implications
is presented in Section 6.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we calculate and analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
induced by each rule. In Section 4, we compare bankruptcy rules in terms of
individual investments and the total investment they induce in equilibrium. In
Section 5, we then compare them in terms of egalitarian and utilitarian social
welfare. We summarize our ndings and conclude in Section 6. Appendix
contains the proofs. Finally, Figures contains graphs used throughout the
text..
Related Literature.
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The axiomatic literature on bankruptcy and taxation problems contains
many studies that analyze the properties of alternative bankruptcy rules. For
example, Dagan (1996), Schummer and Thomson (1997), Herrero and Villar
(2002), and Yeh (2001) analyze properties of CEA. Yeh (2001a), Herrero and
Villar (2002), and Herrero (2003) analyze properties of CEL. Aumann and
Maschler (1985) and the following literature discuss properties of a Talmudic
rule. ONeill (1982), Moulin (1985a,b), Young (1988), Chun (1988a), de Frutos
(1999), Ching and Kakkar (2000), Chambers and Thomson (2002), and Ju,
Miyagawa, and Sakai (2007) analyze properties of PRO. Thomson (2003 and
2008) presents a detailed review of the extensive axiomatic literature.
The corporate nance literature also contains a large number of papers
that study bankruptcy (e.g. see Bebchuck (1988), Aghion, Hart, and Moore
(1992), Atiyas (1995), Hart (1999), Stiglitz (2001)). However, most of these
papers study reorganization procedures such as Chapter 11 in the US. There
are some papers that discuss liquidation procedures (and some, such as Baird
(1986) argue that they are superior to reorganization procedures). For exam-
ple, Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) use a comprehensive data set from the US
to compare liquidation and reorganization procedures in terms of costs and
e¢ ciency. Stromberg (2000) uses Swedish data to evaluate liquidation proce-
dures. Also, Hotchkiss et al (2008) summarize bankruptcy laws in di¤erent
countries and as part of it, describe liquidation procedures (as these constitute
the only resolution to bankruptcy in some countries). Finally, there are studies
that discuss the implications of priority classes on investor behavior. However,
all of these studies take the existing proportional allocation rule (i.e. PRO)
as a given, nonchanging constant and does not discuss its merits in relation to
alternative rules.
There are previous papers that employ game theoretical tools to analyze
bankruptcy problems. Aumann and Maschler (1985), Curiel, Maschler, and
Tijs, (1987), and Dagan and Volij (1993) relate bankruptcy rules to coopera-
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tive game theoretical solutions. Chun (1989) presents a noncooperative game
that implements an egalitarian surplus sharing rule. Dagan, Serrano, and
Volij (1997) present a noncooperative game that implements a large family
of consistent bankruptcy rules by employing the rules two-person version in
the design. Chang and Hu (2008) carry out a similar analysis for a class
of f-justrules. Herrero (2003) implements the CEA and CEL bankruptcy
rules. Garcia-Jurado, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Villar (2006) present noncoopera-
tive games for a large class of acceptablerules. Finally, Eraslan and Y¬lmaz
(2007) and the literature cited therein analyze negotiation games that arise
during reorganization of the bankrupt rm. None of these papers however
focus on investment implications of these bankruptcy rules.
This thesis is closely related to K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s (2010), previously de-
scribed, and Karagözo¼glu (2010) who also designs a noncooperative game and
analyzes investment implications of a class of rules that include PRO, CEA,
and CEL. Aside from the fact that Karagözo¼glu considers the constrained
rules CEA and CEL; the main di¤erences are as follows. In Karagözo¼glu
(2010) model, (i) there are two types of agents (high income and low income)
who (ii) simultaneously choose either zero or full investment of their income,
and (iii) the agents are risk neutral. Due to these di¤erences, our results
are quite di¤erent. In Karagözo¼glu (2010), PRO maximizes total investment
whereas in our setting, the maximizer of total investment is the EL (as seen
in Section 4).6 On the other hand, both studies nd PRO to induce higher
total investment than EA and CEA; respectively. Also, Karagözo¼glu (2010)
does not carry out a welfare analysis but additionally analyzes a class of rules
6According to K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s, this di¤erence is due to two reasons. First, Karagö-
zo¼glu uses binary strategies and this limits the sensitivity of equilibrium total investment
to the problems parameters. Thus, when in binary strategies the two rules induce equal
investment, it might be that EL exceeds PRO when we take into account how much the
agents do invest. The second reason is the di¤erence between EL and CEL:They show in
Appendix B that CEL induces more types of equilibria than EL and in some of them, PRO
induces more total investment than CEL:
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that includes the Talmud rule (the TAL family by Moreno-Ternero and Villar,
2006) and discusses the case of two rms.
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2 Model
Let N = f1; 2g be the set of agents. Each i 2 N has the following Constant
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function ui : R+ ! R on
money: ui(x) =  e aix: Assume that, each i 2 N is risk averse, that is,
ai > 0: Also assume that a1  a2:
Each agent i invests si 2 R+ units of wealth on a risky company. The com-
pany has value
P
N si after investments. With success probability p 2 (0; 1),
this value brings a return r 2 (0; 1] and becomes (1 + r)PN si. With the re-
maining probability (1 p), the company goes bankrupt and its value becomes

P
N si where  2 (0; 1) is the fraction that survives bankruptcy.
In case of bankruptcy, the value of the rm is allocated among the agents
according to a prespecied bankruptcy rule. Formally, a bankruptcy prob-
lem is a vector of claims (i.e. investments) s = (s1; ::; sn) 2 Rn+ and an
endowment E 2 R+ satisfying
P
N si  E. In our model, the bankrupt rm
retains  fraction of its capital.7 Thus E = 
P
N si is a function of s: As a re-
sult, the vector s (together with ) is su¢ cient to fully describe the bankruptcy
problem at hand. Thus in our setting, the class of all bankruptcy problems is
simply R3+:
A bankruptcy rule F assigns each s 2 R2+ to an allocation x 2 R2
satisfying
P
N xi = 
P
N si. In this paper, we will focus on the following
bankruptcy rules. The Proportional Rule (PRO) is dened as follows: for
each i 2 N , PROi(s) = si. The Equal Awards rule (EA) is dened
as EAi(s) =

2
P
N si.The Equal Losses rule (EL) is dened as ELi(s) =
si   1 2
P
N sj:
For each bankruptcy rule F , we analyze two sequential investment
games it induces over the agents. The two games only di¤er in terms of which
agent moves rst. Thus, throughout the paper we will refer to these games as
7This assumption is supported by empirical evidence from Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006)
who note that the rm scale is fairly unrelated to percent value changes in bankruptcy.
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F12 and F21; showing the order of moves. Finally since we will compare the
sequential setting with the simultaneous setting analyzed in K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s
(2010), we will use Fsim to denote the game under F in a simultaneous setting.
Without loss of generality, we will dene Game F12 where agent 1 moves
rst and agent 2 moves second. Game F21, where agent 2 moves rst, is
dened similarly. In Game F12; agent 1s strategy set is S1 = R+ from which
he chooses an investment level s1: Agent 2s strategy set is the set of functions
from R+ to R+, or formally S2 = RR++ . Let S =
Y
N
Si: However with an abuse
of notation we will refer to S2 as the set of actions (values) induced by the
strategies (functions) in the whole strategy set given s1.
A strategy prole s 2 S corresponds for agent i to the lottery that brings
the net return (1+r)si si = rsi with probability p and the net return Fi(s) si
with the remaining probability (1   p). Note that Fi(s)   si  0: The inter-
pretation is that the agent initially borrows si at an interest rate normalized
to 0: If the investment is successful, he receives (1 + r) si, pays back si; and
is left with his prot rsi: In case of bankruptcy, he only receives back Fi(s)
and has to pay back si; so his net prot becomes Fi(s)  si: The same lottery
is obtained from an environment where each agent i allocates his monetary
endowment between a riskless asset (whose return is normalized to 0) and the
risky company. In this second interpretation, assume that the agent does not
have a liquidity constraint. That is, he is allowed to invest more than his en-
dowment. This assumption only serves to rid us from (the rather unrealistic)
boundary cases where some agents spend all their monetary endowment on
the risky rm. Alternatively, one can impose a liquidity constraint but focus
on equilibria which are in the interior of the strategy spaces.
Agent is expected payo¤ from a strategy prole s 2 S is thus
UFi (s) = pui(rsi) + (1  p)ui(Fi(s)  si). (1)
=  pe airsi   (1  p)e aiFi(si;s i)+aisi
11
Let UF =
 
UF1 ; U
F
2

: Let H = f;g [ (R+) [ (R+  R+) be the history set
of the investment game where ; denotes the unique starting history. Moreover
let Z = R+  R+ denotes the set of terminal nodes hence H=Z = f;g [ (R+)
denotes the set of non-terminal (decision) nodes. As mentioned before we are
going to look at two games; (i) in Game F12; the big investor moves rst and
the small investor moves after observing the big investors action, (ii) in Game
F21; the small investor moves rst and, observing his action the big investor
makes his decision. Therefore, the player functions P12 : H=Z ! N and P21 :
H=Z ! N will be dened as follows: P12(h) =
(
1 if h = ;;
2 if o=w
when the big
investor is the rst mover and will be dened as P21(h) =
(
2 if h = ;;
1 if o=w
when the small investor moves rst.
The sequential investment game induced by the bankruptcy rule
F and with the order of moves ij is then dened as GFij = hS;H; Pij; UF i:
Let (GFij) denote the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of GF .
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3 Equilibria Under Alternative Bankruptcy Rules
We start by analyzing the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of each game. This
section serves as a preliminary for our comparisons of individual and total
investment (in Section 4) and welfare (in Section 5).
3.1 When Big Investor Moves First
Throughout the rst part of this section we assume that agent 1 moves rst.
He is called the big investor because he has relatively lower risk aversion level.
Proportional Rule (PRO):
The following proposition shows that under PRO; the investment game
has a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium. Moreover, this strictly dominant
strategy equilibrium is independent of the order of moves.
Proposition 1 If ln

pr
(1 p)(1 )

 0; the investment game under the rule
PRO has a unique dominant strategy equilibrium (0; :::; 0) : Otherwise, the
game has a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium s in which each agent i
chooses a positive investment level si given by
si =
1
ai (r + 1  ) ln

pr
(1  p)(1  )

:
There is no other Nash equilibria.
Note that, if pr > (1 p)(1 ); all agents choose a positive investment level
at the dominant strategy equilibrium. This condition simply compares the
return on unit investment in case of success, r, weighted by the probability of
success, p, with the loss incurred on unit investment in case of failure, (1  ) ;
weighted by the probability of failure, (1  p). Investing in the rm is optimal
if the returns in case of success outweigh the losses incurred in case of failure.
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Equilibrium investment levels are ordered as s1  s2: Also, si is increasing
in the probability of success p and the fraction of the rm that survives bank-
ruptcy  and it is decreasing in the agents degree of risk aversion ai: It does
not have a xed relation to the rate of return in case of success, r.
Equal Awards (EA):
The following proposition determines the form of the subgame perfect Nash
equilibria under EA where the big agent is the rst mover.
Proposition 2 At the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Game un-
der EA12 the equilibrium investment actions are as follows:
(i) if
2pr
(1  p) (2  )  1
or
2pr
(1  p) (2  ) < 1
and

2pr
(1  p) (2  )
a1(2 + 2r   )
a2 +

pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)

> 0
then
s1 =

a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a1 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a2a1 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
s2 =

a2 ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
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(ii) otherwise
s1 = 0
s2 = 0
Equilibrium investment levels are ordered as s1  s2: Also, si is increasing
in the probability of success p and the fraction of the rm that survives bank-
ruptcy  and it is decreasing in the agents degree of risk aversion ai. It does
not have a xed relation to the rate of return in case of success, r.
Equal Losses (EL):
The following proposition shows that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
under EL when the big investor is the rst mover, is of the form s1  s2.
Proposition 3 At the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Game un-
der EL12 the equilibrium investment actions are as follows:
(i) if
2pr
(1  ) (1  p) > 1
and 
p (2r + 1  )
(1  p) (1  )

<

2pr
(1  p) (1  )
a1 (1 + 2r   )
(1  )a2
then
s1 =

a2 (2r + (1  )) ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

  a1 (1  ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2ra1 (r + 1  ) 2
s2 =

 a2 (1  ) ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ ln 2pr
(1 p)(1 ) (2r + (1  )) a1

a2ra1 (r + 1  ) 2
(ii) if
2pr
(1  ) (1  p) > 1
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and
(2r + (1  )) a1 < (1  ) a2
then
s1 =
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

(2r + 1  )a1
s2 = 0
(iii) otherwise
s1 = 0
s2 = 0
Equilibrium investment levels are ordered as s1  s2: Also si is increasing
in the probability of success p and the fraction of the rm that survives bank-
ruptcy  and it is decreasing in the agents degree of risk aversion ai: It does
not have a xed relation to the rate of return in case of success, r.
3.2 When Small Investor Moves First
In the second part of this section we assume that agent 2 moves rst. He is
called the small investor because he has relatively higher risk aversion level.
Proportional Rule (PRO):
As noted in the previous subsection, the investment game under PRO has
a unique dominant strategy equilibrium independent of the order of moves.
Equal Awards (EA):
The following proposition determines the form of the unique subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium under EA where the small agent is the rst mover.
Proposition 4 At the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Game un-
der EA21 the equilibrium investment actions are as follows:
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(i) if
2pr
(1  ) (1  p)  1
or
2pr
(1  p) (2  ) < 1
and

2pr
(1  p) (2  )
a2(2 + 2r   )
a1 +

pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)

> 0
then
s1 =

a1 ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
s2 =

a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
(ii) otherwise
s1 = 0
s2 = 0
Equilibrium investment levels do not have a clear ordering. However, si
is increasing in the probability of success p and the fraction of the rm that
survives bankruptcy  and it is decreasing in the agents degree of risk aversion
ai. It does not have a xed relation to the rate of return in case of success, r.
Equal Losses (EL):
The following proposition shows that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
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under EL when the small investor is the rst mover.
Proposition 5 At the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Game un-
der EL21 the equilibrium investment actions are as follows:
(i) if
2pr
(1  ) (1  p) > 1
and 
p (2r + 1  )
(1  p) (1  )
a1(2r+(1 ))
>

2pr
(1  p) (1  )
a2(1 )
and 
2pr
(1  p) (1  )
a2(1+2r )
>

p (2r + 1  )
(1  p) (1  )
a1(1 )
then
s1 =

a2(2r + (1  )) ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

  a1 ln

p(2r+(1 ))
(1 p)(1 )

(1  )

a2ra1 (r + 1  ) 2
s2 =

a1(2r + (1  )) ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

  a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

(1  )

a1ra2 (r + 1  ) 2
(ii) if
2pr
(1  ) (1  p) > 1
and 
2pr
(1  p) (1  )
a2(1+2r )
<

p (2r + 1  )
(1  p) (1  )
a1(1 )
then
s1 = 0
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s2 =
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

(2r + 1  )a2
(iii) if
2pr
(1  ) (1  p) > 1
and 
p (2r + 1  )
(1  p) (1  )
a1(2r+(1 ))
< a2 ln

2pr
(1  p) (1  )
(1 )a2
then
s1 =
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

(2r + 1  )a1
s2 = 0
(iv)otherwise
s1 = 0
s2 = 0
Equilibrium investment levels do not have a clear ordering. However, si
is increasing in the probability of success p and the fraction of the rm that
survives bankruptcy  and it is decreasing in the agents degree of risk aversion
ai: It does not have a xed relation to the rate of return in case of success, r.
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4 Comparisons of Equilibrium Investment
4.1 Individual Investment Decisions
In this section, we compare bankruptcy rules in terms of the individual invest-
ment levels that they induce in equilibrium. We also look at the e¤ect of the
order of moves on investment behaviour. In order to see the e¤ects of transi-
tion from a simultaneous setting to a sequential setting, let us rst check the
big investors investment levels in a numerical example where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;
 = 0:7; and a2 = 10; Figures 1 and 2 respectively demonstrate s1 under EA
and EL as a function of a1. And then let us also check the small investors
investment levels in a numerical example where r = 0:3; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and
a1 = 3; Figures 3 and 4 respectively demonstrate s2 under EA and EL as a
function of a2.
As can be observed from the graphs no matter which rule we use the
sequential case induces higher investment for the rst mover when compared to
the simultaneous setting. As can be seen in Figure 1, underEA; the investment
levels of the (big) investor 1 are ordered as,
sEA;121 > s
EA;21
1 > s
EA;sim
1 :
Therefore, one can claim that the big investor increases his investment under
EA with sequential moves whether he is the rst mover or not. Under EA12
big investor is the rst mover, therefore, it is reasonable for him to make higher
investment than the investment he makes under EAsim. Moreover the invest-
ment game under EA is supermodular; in other words if an agent increases
his investment, the other agents best response is to increase his investment
as well. By the above logic we expect the small investor to increase his in-
vestment when he is the rst mover, that is, in the case of EA21. Observing
this, due to supermodularity, the big investor will increase his investment as
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well. This ordering is not specic to this numerical example, in fact we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 6 In the interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of invest-
ment games under EA the big investors investment decisions s1 have the
following order
sEA;121 > s
EA;21
1 > s
EA;sim
1 :
In Figure 2,under EL, s1 is ordered as,
sEL;121 > s
EL;sim
1 > s
EA;21
1
Which leads to the idea that big investor increases his investment under EL
with sequential moves when he is the rst mover however he decreases his
investment when he is the second mover.
The reason why big investor increases his investment when he is the rst
mover, under EL12 is the same as EA12. However unlike EA21 he decreases his
investment when he is the second mover. This is mainly because, investment
game under EL is submodular. Under EL21 small investor will increase his
investment decision since he is the rst mover however due to submodularity,
big investors best response is to decrease his investment decision. These give
us the following proposition.
Proposition 7 In the interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of invest-
ment games under EL the big investors investment decisions s1 have the fol-
lowing order.
sEL;121 > s
EL;sim
1 > s
EL;21
1
Figure 3 looks at the small investor, the more risk averse agent 2; under
EA and shows that his equilibrium choice s2 increases under both EA12 and
EA21 compared to the simultaneous case. However, unlike the big investor,
21
his investment decision under EA does not have clear ordering for EA12 and
EA21 since these two curves intersects at a certain risk aversion level. The
intuition behind this intersection is as follows. Both investors increase their
investment levels when they are the rst movers, however, the amount of
this increase is not same across the agents due to the di¤erence in their risk
aversion levels. As expected big investor, who has lower risk aversion level,
increases his investment under EA12 more than the increase in small investors
investment decision under EA21. When small investors risk aversion level
reaches a certain degree, the increase in his investment as a best response to
the big agent under EA12 exceeds the increase in his investment under EA21.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 In terms of small investors investment decision s2. In the
interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of investment games under EA,
simultaneous setting and sequential setting where big investor moves rst have
the following order:
sEA;122 > s
EA;sim
2
simultaneous setting and sequential setting where small investor moves rst
have the following order:
sEA;212 > s
EA;sim
2
sequential setting where big investor moves rst and sequential setting where
small investor moves rst do not have a clear ordering.
Figure 4 depicts the small investors behavior under EL. Due to this gure
small investors investment decision ordering is as,
sEL;212 > s
EL;sim
2 > s
EL;12
2
Although, at rst glance this ordering seems to be di¤erent than the ordering of
the big investors investment decisions, the interpretation is same. The small
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investor makes the highest investment decision under EL21, when he is the
rst mover. However, again due to submodularity he decreases his investment
when he is the second mover, under EL12, compared to ELsim. Again this is
not specic to this certain numerical example.
Proposition 9 In the interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of invest-
ment games under EL the small investors investment decisions s2 have the
following order.
sEL;212 > s
EL;sim
2 > s
EL;12
2
In summary both agents increase their investment decisions under EA
when they move sequentially, independent of the identity of the rst mover,
compared to the case they move simultaneously. Under EL both agents in-
crease their investment decisions in a sequential setting if they are the rst
movers, but they decrease their investment when they are the second movers.
Now let us check individual investment levels in a numerical example for
two investors where r = 0:3; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 3 and for which
Figures 5 and 6 respectively demonstrate s1 and s

2 as a function of a2 for
the three extreme rules under three settings: PRO; EA12; EA21; EAsim; and
EL12; ELsim; EL21
As can be seen in Figure 5, in terms of s1; the three rules are ordered
as EL > PRO > EA independent of the setting. Also, s1 is independent
of a2 under PRO but it is increasing (decreasing) in a2 under EL (EA).
This demonstrates a general phenomenon. The bigger investor, that is, the
relatively less risk averse agent 1, faces very di¤erent incentives under the three
rules. In case of bankruptcy, he is protected best by EL and worst by EA
whereas his share under PRO is independent of the other agents. This reects
on his investment choices.
Figure 6 looks at the smaller investor, the more risk averse agent 2 and
shows that under all three rules, his equilibrium choice s2 is decreasing in
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a2: Also, the three rules do not have a xed order in terms of s2: For low risk
aversion levels (i.e. when agent 2 is not too di¤erent than agent 1), the ordering
of the three rules in terms of s2 is EL > PRO > EA, same as s

1: But it is
reversed for high risk aversion levels. For this case, agent 2 is protected best
under EA and worst under EL and this reects to his equilibrium investment
choices under them. It is also interesting to note that, for risk aversion levels
in between the two extremes, it is PRO that induces the highest investment
level s2 on agent 2.
4.2 Total Investment
Looking at individual investment levels, one does not observe a clear order-
ing of the three rules. However, in terms of total investment, we obtain a
strong result. The following three theorems establish that, in terms of total
investment, the rules analyzed in the previous section are ordered as
EL12 > EL21 > ELsim > PRO > EA12 > EA21 > EAsim:
Theorem 1 In the sequential investment game where the big investor moves
rst, EL induces a higher equilibrium total investment than PRO, which in
turn induces a higher equilibrium total investment than EA.
Theorem 2 In the sequential investment game where the small investor moves
rst, EL induces a higher equilibrium total investment than PRO, which in
turn induces a higher equilibrium total investment than EA.
Theorem 3 In terms of total investment, both EA and EL performs better
under sequential setting than the simultaneous setting.
Corollary 10 By above three theorems in terms total investment we have the
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following ordering of rules
EL12 > EL21 > ELsim > PRO > EA12 > EA21 > EAsim:
In the simultaneous case ELsim induces higher investment than EAsim.
Moreover under sequential setting, although investment games under EA are
supermodular and those under EL are submodular games, EL still induces
higher investment independent of the rst movers identity. This is mainly
because; when the big investor is the rst mover, he increases his investment
under EL12 more than he increases under EA12 as a best response to the
small investor, because he is better protected under EL. And although, small
investor decreases his investment under EL12, the signicant increase in the
big agents investment decision, causes EL12 to induce higher total investment
level than EA12.
In the case where small investor moves rst ;under EL21, as a best response
to small investor, big investor decreases his investment decision. However,
since he is better protected under EL, this decrease is not a drastic one.
So the increase in small investors investment level is more than enough to
compensate this loss, resulting EL21 to induce higher investment than ELsim.
On the other hand although both agents increase their investment levels under
EA21, the total increase is still is not enough to exceed even ELsim. Therefore
by above logic we have EL21 > EA21.
It is interesting to note that, even when all agents are identical in terms of
risk aversion, the ordering of the rules in terms of total investment is as above.
Particularly, EL still induces more total investment than the other rules. This
means that these rules not only di¤er in terms of how they treat big versus
small investors (as discussed at the beginning of this section), but they also
di¤er in terms of the investment incentives that they provide in a symmetric
game where all agents are identical in terms of risk aversion. Moreover, even
when the risk aversion levels are equal sequential case still induces higher total
25
investment . This can be observed in Figures 5 and 6 by choosing a2 = a1 = 3.
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5 Comparisons of Equilibrium Welfare
In this section, we look at the individual and social welfare levels induced by
the Nash equilibria under the PRO, EA, and EL rules with aforementioned
three settings. We compare these three rules under three settings in terms of
both egalitarian and utilitarian social welfare.8
In Figure 7, we x p = 0:8; r = 0:6;  = 0:7; a2 = 10 and demonstrate
individual welfare level of agent 1 as a function of a1:As noted above, an agents
welfare under PRO is independent of his risk aversion level: Thus, it remains
constant at  0:6. The individual welfare under both EA and EL depends on
a1 independent of the setting. At relatively smaller risk aversion levels agent
1 receives highest payo¤ under EL rules. However, as he gets more risk averse
his payo¤ decreases under EL but increases under EA. This is because of the
characteristics of these two rules. Big (small) agent is more protected under
EL(EA) than EA(EL): This e¤ect is obvious when two agents di¤er in terms
of risk aversion drastically. However, as the di¤erence in risk aversion levels
gets smaller, the di¤erence in payo¤s agent 1 receives from these two rules also
gets smaller.
In Figure 8 we can see individual welfare level of agent 2 as a function of a2
where p = 0:8; r = 0:6;  = 0:7; a1 = 3 is xed. Similarly like agent 1, agent
2s welfare under PRO is independent of a2 and remains constant at  0:6:
His welfare under both EA and EL depends on a2 independent of the setting.
By the same logic explained above, when a2 is close to a1. Agent 2s welfare
from EA and EL gets closer independent of the setting. As the di¤erence gets
larger the di¤erence in agent 2s welfare level under EA and EL rules gets
larger as well. This is again because of the characteristics of these two rules.
8Note that this is a partial analysis since we only look at the investment game. Therefore
our welfare analysis include only the playersutilities. However incorporating our investment
game into a general equilibrium model will give us a complete analysis, i which we can
analyze sociatal welfare.
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Figure 9 tries to capture the e¤ect of transition from a simultaneous to a
sequential setting and changing order of moves under EA rules where p = 0:8;
r = 0:6;  = 0:7; a1 = 3: The individual welfare levels of agent 2 is ordered as
EA12 > EA21 > EAsim
Whereas, the individual welfare levels of agent 1 is ordered as
EA21 > EA12 > EAsim
According to above inequalities we can say that transition from a simul-
taneous setting to sequential setting increases both individual welfares and
therefore, total welfare underEA independent of the identity of the rst mover.
Moreover, as expected most of the time the small investor gets higher payo¤
under EA rules. However, this is violated when we change the setting into
sequential and the second agent is the rst mover. This is mainly because;
when risk aversion levels are close enough to each other, the mover e¤ect
dominates the risk aversion e¤ect. Therefore, under these conditions agent 2
may invest more than the agent 1, which in turn results with EA rule favoring
agent 1 rather than agent 2.
Figure 10 demonstrates the e¤ect of transition from a simultaneous to a
sequential setting and changing order of moves under EL rules where p = 0:8;
r = 0:6;  = 0:7; a1 = 3. The individual welfare levels of agent 1 are ordered
as
EL12 > ELsim > EL21
Whereas, agent 2s welfare levels are ordered as
EL21 > ELsim > EL12
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According to above inequalities, when compared to the simultaneous case, an
agents welfare increases when he is the rst mover under a sequential setting,
and it decreases when he is the second mover under a sequential setting.
Under EL rules the investor who makes higher investment is favored. Under
simultaneous and sequential settings where agent 1 is the rst mover, agent
1 always makes a higher investment. However, when we reverse the order
of moves, again the risk aversion e¤ect is dominated by the mover e¤ect, and
when risk aversions are close to each other agent 2may make higher investment
than agent 1. Therefore, in the picture agent 1 always gets higher utility than
agent 2 under a simultaneous setting and a sequential where agent 1 is the
rst mover. However, agent 2s utility may exceed agent 1s under a sequential
setting where agent 2 is the rst mover.
At the symmetric case (when a1 = a2 = 3) agents 1 and 2 receive identical
welfare levels under simultaneous setting independent of the rule. However,
when we transcede to the sequential setting agents welfare levels are not equal.
Finally Figure 11 depicts total welfare levels induced by aforementioned
seven rules as a function of a2, where p = 0:8; r = 0:6;  = 0:7; a1 = 3: As it
can be seen from the picture EL rules induce lower welfare levels than PRO.
This is mainly because although the big investors utility is usually maximized
under EL, the small agent usually su¤er drastically. This e¤ect reects to the
total welfare comparison. When we compare PRO and EA rules, we can see
that for small risk aversion levels where agent 1 and agent 2 are close to each
other in terms of risk aversion, PRO induces higher total welfare. However,
when agent 2 gets more risk averse, his utility increases, and this increase is
greater than the decrease in agent 1 utility, therefore, EA rules exceed PRO
in terms of total welfare after a critical risk aversion level.
If we compare EA rules in terms of setting the order is proportional to the
order of agent 2s individual welfare levels, that is,
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EA12 > EA21 > EAsim
Therefore, we can conclude that according to our picture transceding to a
sequential setting may increase total welfare.
However, the order of EL in terms of setting according to the total welfare
they induce is not clear. For small risk aversion levels of agent 2 simultaneous
case induces higher total welfare, on the other hand as a2 gets higher EL21 gets
closer to simultaneous case. Due to Figure 11, transceding from simultaneous
setting to a sequential may decrease total welfare.
Lemma 1 9Assume a1  a2. Then,
(i) UPRO1 (
 
GPRO

) = UPRO2 (
 
GPRO

);
(ii) UEA1
 

 
GEAsim
  UEA2    GEAsim ; equality achieved if a1 = a2
(iii) UEL1
 

 
GELsim
  UEL2    GELsim ; equality achieved if a1 = a2
(iv) UEL121
 

 
GEL12
  UEL2    GEL12  ; equality is never achieved.
5.1 Egalitarian Social Welfare Levels
The egalitarian social welfare level induced by a rule F is the mini-
mum utility an agent obtains at the Nash equilibrium of the investment game
induced by F :
EGF (p; r; ; a1; a2) = min

UF1 (
 
GF

); UF2 (
 
GF

)
	
:
We next make a numerical comparison of the Egalitarian social welfare lev-
els induced by EL12; EL21; ELsim; PRO;EA12; EA21; EAsim for interior equi-
libria (where both agents choose positive investment levels).10
9Items (i) (ii) and (iii) are proved in K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s (2010)
10We are aware of the fact that, by doing such a simulation we treat each point in the
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By 1 we know thatEGPRO (p; r; ; a1; a2) = UPRO1 (
 
GPRO

) = UPRO2 (
 
GPRO

);
EGEAsim (p; r; ; a1; a2) = U
EAsim
1
 

 
GEAsim

; EGELsim (p; r; ; a1; a2) = U
ELsim
2
 

 
GELsim

;
EGEL12 (p; r; ; a1; a2) = U
EL
2
 

 
GEL12

:While comparing these rules we
will use the corresponding Egalitarian social welfare functions, however, for
the rules that have no clear ordering across agents in terms of utilities we will
use min

UF1 (
 
GF

); UF2 (
 
GF

)
	
as our function.
5.1.1 PRO vs. EL rules
PRO vs. EL12
This case corresponds to 1497729 parameter combinations. Among them,
PRO induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
PRO vs. EL21
This case corresponds to 1290567 parameter combinations. Among them,
PRO induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
PRO vs. ELsim
Due to K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s we know that PRO induces higher Egalitarian
social welfare than ELsim independent of the parameters used.
5.1.2 PRO vs. EA rules
PRO vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 5443671 parameter combinations. Among them,
PRO induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
PRO vs. EA21
parameter space as equally important. However there may be some points that may be
more to our interest. Nevertheless, since it is not possible to do such an analysis we assume
each point has the same measure.
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This case corresponds to 3569074 parameter combinations. Among them,
PRO induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
PRO vs. EAsim
Due to K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s we know that PRO induces higher Egalitarian
social welfare than EAsim independent of the parameters used.
5.1.3 EA rules
EAsim vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 3337553 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare 1297509 times (38 percent) and EAsim
induce a higher social welfare 2040044 times (62 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EAsim vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 3337553 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA21induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce the
same welfare level.
EA12 vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 3569074 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare 1151577 times (32 percent) and EAsim
induce a higher social welfare 2417479 times (68 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
5.1.4 EL rules
ELsim vs. EL12
This case corresponds to 448875 parameter combinations. Among them,
EL12 induce a higher social welfare 293143 times (65 percent) and ELsim
induce a higher social welfare 155732 times (35 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
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ELsim vs. EL21
This case corresponds to 320264 parameter combinations. Among them,
EL21 induce a higher social welfare 235984 times (73 percent) and ELsim
induce a higher social welfare 84280 times (27 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EL12 vs. EL21
This case corresponds to 1206143 parameter combinations. Among them,
EL12 induce a higher social welfare 457178times (37 percent) and EL21 induce
a higher social welfare 748965 times (63 percent). The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
5.1.5 EA rules vs. EL rules
EL12 vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 1386471 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare 849592 times (61 percent). The two rules
never induce the same welfare level and EL12 induce a higher social welfare
536879 times (38 percent).
EL21 vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 1185588 parameter combinations. Among them,
EL21 induce a higher social welfare 274660times (24 percent) and EA21 induce
a higher social welfare 910928 times (76 percent). The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
EL12 vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 134365 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA21 induce a higher social welfare 946180times (70 percent) and EL12 induce
a higher social welfare 397425 times (70 percent). The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
EAsim vs. EL12
This case corresponds to 1326168 parameter combinations. Among them,
33
EAsim induce a higher social welfare 831789 times (62 percent) and EL12
induce a higher social welfare 494379 times (38 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
ELsim vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 1513392 parameter combinations. Among them,
ELsim induce a higher social welfare658214 times (44 percent) andEA12 induce
a higher social welfare 831789 times (56 percent). The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
EAsim vs. EL21
This case corresponds to 1172243 parameter combinations. Among them,
EAsim induce a higher social welfare 823507 times (70 percent) and EL21
induce a higher social welfare 348736 times (29 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EAsim vs. ELsim
This case corresponds to 1294986 parameter combinations. Among them,
EAsim induce a higher social welfare 949377 times (73 percent) and ELsim
induce a higher social welfare 345609 times (27 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EL21 vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 1192701 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare 775930times (65 percent) and EL21 induce
a higher social welfare 416772 times (35 percent). The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
ELsim vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 755209 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA21 induce a higher social welfare 501131 times (66 percent) and EA21 induce
a higher social welfare 254078 times (34 percent). The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
According to this numerical analysis, in terms of Egalitarian welfare in-
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duced by the rules, they exhibit following ordering
PRO > EA21 > EAsim > EA12 > EL21 > EL12 > ELsim
Transition from simultaneous case to a sequential case increases Egalitar-
ian social welfare induced under EL rules independent of the order of moves
whereas may decreases under EA12 and increase under EA21.
5.2 Utilitarian Social Welfare Levels
The utilitarian social welfare level induced by a rule F is the total
utility the two agents obtain at the Nash equilibrium of the investment game
induced by F :
UT F (p; r; ; a1; a2) = U
F
1 (
 
GF

) + UF2 (
 
GF

):
We next compare numerically the Utilitarian social welfare levels induced
by EL12; EL21; ELsim; PRO; EA12; EA21; EAsim for interior equilibria (where
both agents choose positive investment levels)11
5.2.1 PRO vs. EL rules
PRO vs. EL12
This case corresponds to 2278616 parameter combinations. Among them,
PRO induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
PRO vs. EL21
11We are aware of the fact that, by doing such a simulation we treat each point in the
parameter space as equally important. However there may be some points that may be
more to our interest. Nevertheless, since it is not possible to do such an analysis we assume
each point has the same measure.
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This case corresponds to 2407596 parameter combinations. Among them,
PRO induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
PRO vs. ELsim
Due to K¬br¬s and K¬br¬s we know that PRO induces higher Utilitarian
social welfare than ELsim independent of the parameters used.
5.2.2 PRO vs. EA rules
PRO vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 5524804 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare 2489872 times (45 percent) and PRO
induce a higher social welfare 3034932 times (55 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
PRO vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 5404342 parameter combinations. Among them,
PRO induce a higher social welfare 2950961 times (55 percent) and EA21
induce a higher social welfare 2453381 times (45 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
PRO vs. EAsim
This case corresponds to 2726424 parameter combinations. Among them,
PRO induce a higher social welfare 1659219 times (61 percent) and EAsim
induce a higher social welfare 1067205 times (39 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
5.2.3 EA rules
EAsim vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 525336 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
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EAsim vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 525336 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA21 induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
EA12 vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 5404342 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
5.2.4 EL rules
ELsim vs. EL12
This case corresponds to 2099043 parameter combinations. Among them,
ELsim induce a higher social welfare 1494900 times (71 percent) and EL12
induce a higher social welfare 604143 times (29 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
ELsim vs. EL21
This case corresponds to 2800745 parameter combinations. Among them,
ELsim induce a higher social welfare 1656734 times (60 percent) and EL21
induce a higher social welfare 1144011 times (40 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EL12 vs. EL21
This case corresponds to 2278616 parameter combinations. Among them,
EL21 induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
5.2.5 EA rules vs. EL rules
EL12 vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 1500943 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare 1494900 times (96 percent) and EL12
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induce a higher social welfare 6043 times (4 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EL21 vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 2784548 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA21 induce a higher social welfare 1645550 times (59 percent) and EL21
induce a higher social welfare 1138998 times (41 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EL12 vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 2069680 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA21 induce a higher social welfare 1485381 times (72 percent) and EL12
induce a higher social welfare 584299 times (28 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EAsim vs. EL12
This case corresponds to 2019852 parameter combinations. Among them,
EAsim induce a higher social welfare 1479352 times (73 percent) and EL12
induce a higher social welfare 284166 times (38 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
ELsim vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 4352013 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
EAsim vs. EL21
This case corresponds to 2712991 parameter combinations. Among them,
EAsim induce a higher social welfare 1639000 times (60 percent) and EL21
induce a higher social welfare 1073991 times (40 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EAsim vs. ELsim
This case corresponds to 1294986 parameter combinations. Among them,
EAsim induce a higher social welfare 851736 times (66 percent) and ELsim
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induce a higher social welfare 540500 times (34 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
EL21 vs. EA12
This case corresponds to 2823713 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA12 induce a higher social welfare 1656734 times (58 percent) and EL21
induce a higher social welfare 1166979 times (42 percent). The two rules never
induce the same welfare level.
ELsim vs. EA21
This case corresponds to 4274562 parameter combinations. Among them,
EA21 induce a higher social welfare every time. The two rules never induce
the same welfare level.
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6 Conclusion
Our analysis compares the proportionality, equal awards, and equal losses
principles under three settings (simultaneous, sequential where big investor
moves rst, sequential where small investor moves rst) in terms of two criteria
(total investment and social welfare induced in equilibrium) that were not
considered in a sequential setting before. Our ndings are as follows:
(i) In terms of total investment, there is a constant ranking of these rules
which is independent of the parameter values considered:
Total Investment: EL12 > EL21 > ELsim > PRO > EA12 > EA21 > EAsim
(ii) According to our numerical analysis, PRO always induces a higher egal-
itarian social welfare than both EA and EL in an interior equilibrium, inde-
pendent of both the setting used and identity of the rst mover. Also, our
numerical analysis shows that EA exceeds EL independent of setting used.
According to the numerical analysis in terms of egalitarian social welfare in-
duced, rules are ordered as;
Egalitarian social welfare: PRO > EA21 > EAsim > EA12 > EL21 > EL12 > ELsim:
(iii) According to our numerical analysis, PRO induces a higher utilitarian
social welfare than both EA and EL in an interior equilibrium, independent
of both the setting used and identity of the rst mover. Also, our numerical
analysis shows that EA exceeds EL independent of setting used. According
to the numerical analysis in terms of utilitarian social welfare induced, rules
are ordered as;
Utilitarian social welfare: PRO > EA12 > EA21 > EAsim > ELsim > EL21 > EL12:
(iv) There always is a unique dominant strategy equilibrium under PRO
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(where agents play strictly dominant strategies). No other rule induces domi-
nant strategies. However, under both EA and EL, a unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium always exists independent of the setting.
Overall, the almost universal principle of proportionality does not maxi-
mize total investment in the economy. By switching from proportionality to
equal losses, it is possible to increase total investment. However, this switch
may cause a welfare loss in the society, both according to the egalitarian and
utilitarian social welfare functions. A switch from proportionality to the equal
awards principle always decreases total investment. It is also interesting to
note that it also may lower egalitarian social welfare.
Moreover, comparing equilibria at di¤erent risk-aversion proles shows us
that the three principles are very di¤erent in terms of the incentives that
they provide for big versus small investors. The equal losses principle o¤ers
relatively better protection to the bigger (i.e. less risk averse) investors. The
equal awards principle does the opposite. The proportionality principle strikes
a compromise by o¤ering the same proportion of their investment to every
agent.
Finally, a transition from a simultaneous case to a sequential case always
increases total investment independent of the order of moves. Also, a transition
from a simultaneous case to a sequential case may increase egalitarian social
welfare, however, due to the rule used it may decrease (under EL) or increase
(under EA) social welfare. Similarly according to our numerical analysis, a
transition from a simultaneous setting to a sequential setting will increase
(decrease) utilitarian social welfare under EA (EL) independent of the order
of moves.
Note that our social welfare measures only consider the investors in the
game. They do not take into account the welfare implications of investment
in the rest of the economy (such as welfare e¤ects of investment on consumers
or future generations). This is an interesting question which is, unfortunately,
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out of the scope of our current model.
For tractability of the model, we use CARA utility functions. While the
CARA family is widely used in economic modeling as well as nance, it is an
open question whether our ndings are replicated with other families of utility
functions.
In our model, the rate of return r and the probability of success p are
independent of the agentsinvestment levels. It might be interesting to look
at extensions of the model where these parameters, in some way, depend on
the investment levels.
Finally an extension of these work can be done by allowing heterogeneity
in investment type, such as, secured vs. nonsecured investment. It will be in-
teresting to analyze such game and check whether if our ndings are consistent
with such case.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof. (Proposition 1) PRO, as a function of the investment levels, is
dened as PROi(s) = si: Then, by Equation 1, agent is utility under PRO
can be written as
UPROi (s) =  pe airsi   (1  p)eaisi(1 ):
Note that the payo¤ function of agent i is independent of the other agents
investment levels. The unconstrained maximizer of this expression is
i (s i) =
1
ai (r + 1  ) ln

pr
(1  p)(1  )

:
The best response function of agent i can then be written as bi(s i) = max f0; i (s i)g :
Note that this expression is independent of s i: So it in fact denes a strictly
dominant strategy for each agent i.
Proof. (Proposition 2) By Equation 1, agent is utility under EA12 becomes
UEA12i (si; sj) =  pe airsi   (1  p)e ai(

2
(si+sj))+aisi
UEA121 (s1; s2) =  pe a1rs1   (1  p)ea1s1(
2 
2 ) a1 2 s2
UEA122 (s1; s2) =  pe a2rs2   (1  p)ea2s2(
2 
2 ) a2 2 s1
The unconstrained maximizer of UEA122 (s1; s2) is
2 (s1) =
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a2 (2 (1 + r)  ) +
s1
(2 (1 + r)  )
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Thus, agent 2s best response is b2 (s1) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
2 (s1) if
2pr
(1 p)(2 )  1
or
2pr
(1 p)(2 ) < 1 and s

1 >  2
ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 ))
a2
0 otherwise
Case 1 : 2pr
(1 p)(2 )  1 then given b2 (s1) the maximizer of UEA121 (s1; 2 (s1))
is
s1 =

a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a1 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a2a1 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
Note that, s1 > 0 if the numerator is positive and by assumption we have
following inequality
2pr
(1  p) (2  )  1
Moreover, it is easy to show that
pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p) >
2pr
(1  p) (2  )
So if 2pr
(1 p)(2 )  1 then pr(2+2r )(2+2r (2+r))(1 p) > 1. Therefore, s1 > 0
Given s1; 2 (s1) becomes
s2 =

a2 ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1) :
Hence under Case 1 agents investment levels are according to the formulas
(s1; s

2)
Case 2: 2pr
(1 p)(2 ) < 1 and s

1 >  2
ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 ))
a2
Then, given b2 (s1) the maximizer of U
EA12
1 (s1; 2 (s1)) is
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s1 =

a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a1 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a2a1 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
Note that, s1 > 0; if the numerator is positive, that means s

1 > 0; if the
following inequality is true
a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln

pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)

>  a1 ln

2pr
(1  p) (2  )

Now, substituting s1 into the inequality s

1 >  2
ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 ))
a2
and rearranging
it gives us the following inequality
a2 ln

pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)

>  a1(2 + 2r   ) ln

2pr
(1  p) (2  )

By assumption this inequality is true and it implies the condition for s1 > 0
Given s1; 2 (s1) becomes
s2 =

a2 ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1) :
Therefore under Case 2, agentsinvestment levels are according to the formu-
las (s1; s

2)
Case 3: 2pr
(1 p)(2 ) < 1 and s

1 <  2
ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 ))
a2
then b2 (s1) = 0 and the maximizer of U
EA12
1 (s1; 0) is
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a1 (2 (1 + r)  )
Which is negative since 2pr
(1 p)(2 ) < 1 therefore under we assume agent 1 makes
zero investment
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Note that our assumption is not violated under this case since
0 <  2
ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a2
Therefore, under Case 3 agents investment levels are (0; 0)
Proof. (Proposition 3) By Equation 1, agent is utility under EL12 becomes
UEL12i (si; sj) =  pe airsi   (1  p)e(
(1 )
2 )aisi+
(1 )
2
ai
P
Nni sj :
UEL121 (s1; s2) =  pe a1rs1   (1  p)e(
(1 )
2 )a1(s1+s2)
UEL122 (s1; s2) =  pe a2rs2   (1  p)e(
(1 )
2 )a2(s1+s2)
The unconstrained maximizer of UEL122 (s1; s2) is
2 (s1) =
2 ln

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

a2 (2r + (1  ))  
(1  ) s1
(2r + (1  )) :
Thus, agent 2s best response is b2 (s1) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
2 (s1) if
2pr
(1 p)(1 ) > 1
and
s1 <
2 ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 ))
a2(1 )
0 otherwise
:
Case 1 : 2pr
(1 p)(1 ) > 1 and s

1 <
2 ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 ))
a2(1 ) then given b2 (s1) = 2 (s1) the
maximizer of UEL121 (s1; 2 (s1)) is
s1 =

a2 (2r + (1  )) ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

  a1 (1  ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2ra1 (r + 1  ) 2
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Note that, s1 > 0 since
a2 (2r + (1  )) ln

p (2r + 1  )
(1  p) (1  )

> a1 (1  ) ln

2pr
(1  p) (1  )

Then inserting s1 into 2 (s1) gives us second agents equilibrium investment
s2 =

a1 (2r + (1  )) ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

  a2 (1  ) ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

a2ra1 (r + 1  ) 2 :
Hence under Case 1 agents investment levels are according to the formulas
(s1; s

2)
Before moving to the second case, note that substituting s1 into the inequality
s1 <
2 ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 ))
a2(1 ) and rearranging it gives us the following inequality;

p (2r + 1  )
(1  p) (1  )

<

2pr
(1  p) (1  )
a1 (1 + 2r   )
(1  )a2
Case 2: 2pr
(1 p)(1 ) > 1 and

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

<

2pr
(1 p)(1 )
a1(1+2r )
(1 )a2 then given
b2 (s1) = 0 the maximizer of U
EL12
1 (s1; 0) is
2 ln

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

a1 (2r + (1  ))
Which is positive by assumption 2pr
(1 )(1 p) > 1
Note that, b2 (s1) = 0 if the following holds
2 ln

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

a1 (2r + (1  )) >
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2 (1  )
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And this inequality holds if the following holds
a1 (2r + (1  )) < a2 (1  )
Which is true by assumption
Therefore under Case 2 agents make following investment levels: (
2 ln( 2pr(1 )(1 p))
a1(2r+(1 )) ; 0)
Case 3: 2pr
(1 p)(1 ) < 1 then given b2 (s1) = 0 the maximizer of U
EL12
1 (s1; 0) is
2 ln

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

a1 (2r + (1  ))
Which is negative by assumption 2pr
(1 )(1 p) < 1
Therefore under Case 3 agents make following investment levels.(0; 0).
Proof. (Proposition 4) By Equation 1, agent is utility under EA12 becomes
UEA21i (si; sj) =  pe airsi   (1  p)e ai(

2
(si+sj))+aisi
UEA211 (s1; s2) =  pe a1rs1   (1  p)ea1s1(
2 
2 ) a1 2 s2
UEA212 (s1; s2) =  pe a2rs2   (1  p)ea2s2(
2 
2 ) a2 2 s1
The unconstrained maximizer of UEA211 (s1; s2) is
1 (s2) =
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a1 (2 (1 + r)  ) +
s2
(2 (1 + r)  )
Thus, agent 1s best response is b1 (s2) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 (s2) if
2pr
(1 p)(2 )  1
or
2pr
(1 p)(2 ) < 1 and s

2 >  2
ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 ))
a1
0 otherwise
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Case 1 : 2pr
(1 p)(2 )  1 then given b1 (s2) = 1 (s2) the maximizer of UEA212 (1 (s2) ; s2)
is
s2 =

a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
Note that, s2 > 0; if the numerator is positive. That is,
ln

pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)

a1 (2 + 2r   ) >   ln

2pr
(1  p) (2  )

a2
By assumption we have following inequality
2pr
(1  p) (2  )  1
Moreover, it is easy to show that
pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p) >

2pr
(1  p) (2  )

So if 2pr
(1 p)(2 )  1 then pr(2+2r )(2+2r (2+r))(1 p) . Hence, s2 > 0
Given s2; 1 (s2) becomes
s1 =

a1 ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1) :
Therefore, under Case 1 agentsinvestment levels are according to the formulas
(s1; s

2)
Case 2: 2pr
(1 p)(2 ) < 1 and s

2 >  2
ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 ))
a1
then given b1 (s2) = 1 (s2)
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the maximizer of UEA122 (1 (s2) ; s2) is
s2 =

a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
Note that s2 > 0 if the numerator is positive. That is,
ln

pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)

a1 (2 + 2r   ) >   ln

2pr
(1  p) (2  )

a2
Now, substituting s2 into the inequality s

2 >  2
ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a1
and rearrang-
ing it gives us the following inequality;
ln

pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)

a1 >   ln

2pr
(1  p) (2  )

a2(2 + 2r  )
By assumption this inequality is true and it implies the condition for s2 > 0
Hence, under Case 1 agentsinvestment levels are according to the formulas
(s1; s

2)
Case 3: 2pr
(1 p)(2 ) < 1 and s

2 <  2
ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 ))
a1
then given b1 (s2) = 0 the
maximizer of UEA212 (0; s2) is
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a2 (2 (1 + r)  )
Which is negative by assumption 2pr
(1 p)(2 ) < 1; but we assume agent 1s in-
vestment is 0
Note that, our assumption is not violated under this case since
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0 <  2
ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a1
Therefore under Case 3 agents agentsinvestment levels are (0; 0)
Proof. (Proposition 5) By Equation 1, agent is utility under EL21 becomes
UEL21i (si; sj) =  pe airsi   (1  p)e(
(1 )
2 )aisi+
(1 )
2
ai
P
Nni sj :
UEL211 (s1; s2) =  pe a1rs1   (1  p)e(
(1 )
2 )a1(s1+s2)
UEL212 (s1; s2) =  pe a2rs2   (1  p)e(
(1 )
2 )a2(s1+s2)
The unconstrained maximizer of UEL211 (s1; s2) is
1 (s2) =
2 ln

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

a1 (2r + (1  ))  
(1  ) s2
(2r + (1  )) :
Thus, agent 1s best response is b1 (s2) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 (s2) if
2pr
(1 p)(2 ) > 1
and
s2 <
2 ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 ))
a1(1 )
0 otherwise
Case 1 : 2pr
(1 p)(1 ) > 1 and s

2 <
2 ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 ))
a1(1 ) and

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )
a1(2r+(1 ))
>
2pr
(1 p)(1 )
a2(1 )
then given b1 (s2) = 1 (s2) the maximizer of U
EL21
2 (1 (s2) ; s2)
is
s2 =

a1(2r + (1  )) ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

  a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

(1  )

a1ra2 (r + 1  ) 2
Note that s2 > 0 if the numerator is positive, which is true by assumption.
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Then, inserting s2 into 1 (s2) gives us the agent 1s equilibrium investment
s1 =

a2(2r + (1  )) ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

  a1 ln

p(2r+(1 ))
(1 p)(1 )

(1  )

a2ra1 (r + 1  ) 2 :
Hence under Case 1 agents investment levels are according to the formulas
(s1; s

2)
Case 2: 2pr
(1 p)(1 ) > 1 and s

2 <
2 ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 ))
a1(1 ) and

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )
a1(2r+(1 )) 
2pr
(1 p)(1 )
a2(1 )
then given b1 (s2) = 1 (s2) the maximizer of U
EL21
2 (1 (s2) ; s2)
is
s2 =

a1(2r + (1  )) ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

  a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

(1  )

a1ra2 (r + 1  ) 2
Which is negative, by assumption;
p (2r + 1  )
(1  p) (1  )
a1(2r+(1 ))


2pr
(1  p) (1  )
a2(1 )
Therefore, we will assume agent 2 is making 0 investment, given that, 1 (0)
is equal to the following expression;
2 ln

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

a1 (2r + (1  ))
Which is positive by assumption 2pr
(1 p)(1 ) > 1:
Moreover, note that our assumption is not violated since
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0 <
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a1 (1  )
Therefore under Case 2 agents make following investment levels; (
2 ln( 2pr(1 )(1 p))
a1(2r+(1 )) ; 0)
Case 3: 2pr
(1 )(1 p) > 1 and s

2 >
2 ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 ))
a1(1 ) then given b1 (s2) = 0 the maxi-
mizer of UEL212 (0; s2) is
2 ln

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

a2 (2r + (1  ))
This expression is positive, since by assumption:

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

> 1
Note that, again our assumption is not violated since
2 ln

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

a2 (2r + (1  )) >
2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a1 (1  )
Hence under Case 3 agents have the following investment levels, (0;
2 ln( 2pr(1 )(1 p))
a2(2r+(1 )) )
Case 4: 2pr
(1 )(1 p)  1 then, given b1 (s2) = 0; the maximizer of UEL212 (0; s2)
is
2 ln

2pr
(1 )(1 p)

a2 (2r + (1  ))
This expression is negative, since by assumption: 2pr
(1 )(1 p)  1. Therefore, we
will assume agent 2s investment level is 0
Then, under Case 4, both agents make 0 investment.
Proof. (Proposition 6) First lets prove sEA;121 > s
EA;21
1
sEA;121 =

a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a1 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a2a1 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
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sEA;211 =

a1 ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
We want to show that
(a2(2+2r ) ln( pr(2+2r )(2+2r (2+r))(1 p))+a1 ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 )))
2a2a1(r+1)(r +1) >
(a1 ln( pr(2+2r )(2+2r (2+r))(1 p))+a2(2+2r ) ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 )))
2a1a2(r+1)(r +1)
By simplifying rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a1 ln

2pr
(1  p) (2  )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)
pr (2 + 2r   )

| {z }
1
x
+
a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln( pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)
(1  p)(2  )
2pr| {z }
x
) > 0
Dene
x =
pr (2 + 2r   )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) (1  p)
(1  p)(2  )
2pr
Then by following property of ln: lnx =   ln 1
x
the inequality is again reduced
to
(a2 (2 + 2r   )  a1) ln( (2  ) (2r    + 2)
((2  ) r   2 + 2) 2) > 0
which is true since a2 (2 + 2r   )  a1 > 0 and (2 )(2r +2)((2 )r 2+2)2 > 1
Now lets prove that sEA;211 > s
EA;sim
1
sEA;211 =

a1 ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
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sEA;sim1 =
2(1 + r   ) +  + a1 1a2
a12(1 + r   )(1 + r) ln(
2pr
(1  p) (2  ))
We want to show that
(a1 ln( pr(2+2r )(2+2r (2+r))(1 p))+a2(2+2r ) ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 )))
2a1a2(r+1)(r +1) >
2(1+r )++a1 1a2
a12(1+r )(1+r) ln(
2pr
(1 p)(2 ))
By simplifying rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a1 ln

(2 + 2r   ) (2  )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) 2

+a2 (2 + 2r   ) ln( 2pr
(1  p) (2  )
(1  p)(2  )
2pr| {z }
=1
)
| {z }
=0
> 0
Which is true since a1 > 0 and ln

(2+2r )(2 )
(2+2r (2+r))2

> 0
Proof. (Proposition 7) First lets show sEL;121 > s
EL;sim
1
sEL;121 =

2a2

r + (1 )
2

ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

  a1 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

(1  )

a2ra1 (r + 1  ) 2
sEL;sim1 =
(2r    + 1)
2r(r    + 1)(
1
a1
  (1  )
(1   + 2r)
1
a2
) ln(
2pr
(1  p)(1  ))
Want to show0@2a2
0@r+(1  )
2
1A ln( p(2r+1 )(1 p)(1 )) a1 ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 ))(1 )
1A
a2ra1(r+1 )2 >
(2r +1)
2r(r +1)(
1
a1
  (1 )
(1 +2r)
1
a2
) ln( 2pr
(1 p)(1 ))
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
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a2(2r+1 ) ln

(2r + 1  )
2r

 a1 (1  ) ln( 2pr
(1  p) (1  )
(1  )(1  p)
2pr| {z }
=1
)
| {z }
=0
> 0
which is true since a2(2r + 1  ) > 0 and ln

(2r+1 )
2r

> 0
Secondly lets check sEL;sim1 > s
EL;21
1
sEL;211 =

a2(2r + (1  )) ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

  a1 ln

p(2r+(1 ))
(1 p)(1 )

(1  )

a2ra1 (r + 1  ) 2
sEL;sim1 =
(2r + (1  ))
2r(r    + 1) (
1
a1
  (1  )
(1   + 2r)
1
a2
) ln(
2pr
(1  p)(1  ))
Want to show
(2r+(1 ))
2r(r +1) (
1
a1
  (1 )
(1 +2r)
1
a2
) ln( 2pr
(1 p)(1 )) >
(a2(2r+(1 )) ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 )) a1 ln(
p(2r+(1 ))
(1 p)(1 ) )(1 ))
a2ra1(r+1 )2
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a1(1 ) ln

(2r + 1  )
2r

 a2(2r + (1  )) ln( 2pr
(1  p) (1  )
(1  )(1  p)
2pr| {z }
=1
)
| {z }
=0
> 0
Which is true since a1(1  ) > 0 and ln

(2r+1 )
2r

> 0
Proof. (Proposition 8) We check if the following inequality holds; sEA;122 >
sEA;sim2
sEA;122 =

a2 ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
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sEA;sim2 =
2(1 + r   ) +  + a2 1a1
a22(1 + r   )(1 + r) ln(
2pr
(1  p) (2  ))
Want to show
(a2 ln( pr(2+2r )(2+2r (2+r))(1 p))+a1(2+2r ) ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 )))
2a1a2(r+1)(r +1) >
2(1+r )++a2 1a1
a22(1+r )(1+r) ln(
2pr
(1 p)(2 ))
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln
0BB@ 2pr(1  p) (2  ) (1  p)(2  )2pr| {z }
=1
1CCA
| {z }
=0
+a2 ln(
(2 + 2r   ) (2  )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) 2 > 0
Which is true since a2 > 0 and
(2+2r )(2 )
(2+2r (2+r))2 > 1
Now we check if the following is true sEA;212 > s
EA;sim
2
sEA;212 =

a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln

pr(2+2r )
(2+2r (2+r))(1 p)

+ a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

2a1a2 (r + 1) (r    + 1)
sEA;sim2 =
2(1 + r   ) +  + a2 1a1
a22(1 + r   )(1 + r) ln(
2pr
(1  p) (2  ))
Want to show
(a1(2+2r ) ln( pr(2+2r )(2+2r (2+r))(1 p))+a2 ln( 2pr(1 p)(2 )))
2a1a2(r+1)(r +1) >
2(1+r )++a2 1a1
a22(1+r )(1+r) ln(
2pr
(1 p)(2 ))
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
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a1 (2 + 2r   ) ln

(2 + 2r   ) (2  )
(2 + 2r   (2 + r) ) 2

+a2 ln(
2pr
(1  p) (2  )
(1  p)(2  )
2pr| {z }
=1
)
| {z }
=0
> 0
Which is true since a1 (2 + 2r   ) > 0 and (2+2r )(2 )(2+2r (2+r))2 > 1
Proof. (Proposition 9)First we show that sEL;212 > s
EL;sim
2
sEL;212 =

a1(2r + (1  )) ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

  a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

(1  )

a1ra2 (r + 1  ) 2
sEL;sim2 =
(2r    + 1)
2r(r    + 1)(
1
a2
  (1  )
(1   + 2r)
1
a1
) ln(
2pr
(1  p)(1  ))
Want to show
(a1(2r+(1 )) ln( p(2r+1 )(1 p)(1 )) a2 ln( 2pr(1 p)(1 ))(1 ))
a1ra2(r+1 )2 >
(2r +1)
2r(r +1)(
1
a2
  (1 )
(1 +2r)
1
a1
) ln( 2pr
(1 p)(1 ))
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a1(2r+1 ) ln

(2r + 1  )
2r

 a2 (1  ) ln( 2pr
(1  p) (1  )
(1  )(1  p)
2pr| {z }
=1
)
| {z }
=0
> 0
Which is true since a1(2r + 1  ) > 0 and ln

(2r + 1  )
2r

> 0
Now lets check if the following holds sEL;sim2 > s
EL;12
2
sEL;122 =
(2r + (1  ))

 a2 (1  ) ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

(2r + (1  )) a1

2 (2r + 1  ) a2ra1 (r + 1  )
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sEL;sim2 =
(2r    + 1)
2r(r    + 1)(
1
a2
  (1  )
(1   + 2r)
1
a1
) ln(
2pr
(1  p)(1  ))
Want to show
(2r +1)
2r(r +1)(
1
a2
  (1 )
(1 +2r)
1
a1
) ln( 2pr
(1 p)(1 )) >
2(r+ (1 )2 )

 a2(1 )
2
ln( p(2r+1 )(1 p)(1 ))+ln(
2pr
(1 p)(1 ))(r+
(1 )
2 )a1

(2r+1 )a2ra1(r+1 )
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a2(1 ) ln

(2r + 1  )
2r

 a1 (2r + (1  )) ln( 2pr
(1  p) (1  )
(1  )(1  p)
2pr| {z }
=1
)
| {z }
=0
> 0
Which is true since a2(1  ) > 0 and (2r + 1  )
2r
> 1
Proof. (Theorem 1)The theorem is basically saying that in terms of total
investment EL12 > PRO > EA12
Lets rstly show that in terms of total investment EL12 > PRO
PRO =
ln( pr
(1 p)(1 ))(a2 + a1)
a2a1(1   + r)
EL12 =

a2 ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ a1 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2a1 (r + 1  )
Want to show
a2 ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ a1 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2a1 (r + 1  ) >
ln( pr
(1 p)(1 ))(a2 + a1)
a2a1(1   + r)
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
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a2 ln(
(2r + 1  )
r
) + a1 ln(2) > 0
Which is true since all of the terms are greater than 0
Now lets show that in terms of total investment PRO > EA12
EA12 =

a2 ln

pr(2+2r )
(1 p)((2 )r 2+2)

+ ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a1

a2a1 (r    + 1)
PRO =
ln( pr
(1 p)(1 ))(a2 + a1)
a2a1(1   + r)
Want to show
ln( pr
(1 p)(1 ))(a2 + a1)
a2a1(r    + 1) >

a2 ln

pr(2+2r )
(1 p)((2 )r 2+2)

+ ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a1

a2a1 (r    + 1)
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a2 ln(
(2  )r + 2  2
(1  )(2 + 2r   )) + a1 ln(
2  
2  2 ) > 0
Which is true since all of the terms are greater than 0
Proof. (Theorem 2)We want to prove that in terms of total investment
EL21 > PRO > EA21
Firstly lets show that in terms of total investment EL21 > PRO
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PRO =
ln( pr
(1 p)(1 ))(a2 + a1)
a2a1(1   + r)
EL21 =

a1 ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2a1 (r + 1  )
Want to show
a1 ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2a1 (r + 1  ) >
ln( pr
(1 p)(1 ))(a2 + a1)
a2a1(1   + r)
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a1 ln(
(2r + 1  )
r
) + a2 ln(2) > 0
Which is true since all of the terms are greater than 0.
Now lets check if in terms of total investment the following holds; PRO > EA21
EA21 =

a1 ln

pr(2+2r )
(1 p)((2 )r 2+2)

+ ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a2

a2a1 (r    + 1)
PRO =
ln( pr
(1 p)(1 ))(a2 + a1)
a2a1(1   + r)
Want to show
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ln( pr
(1 p)(1 ))(a2 + a1)
a2a1(r    + 1) >

a1 ln

pr(2+2r )
(1 p)((2 )r 2+2)

+ ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a2

a2a1 (r    + 1)
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a1 ln(
(2  )r + 2  2
(1  )(2 + 2r   )) + a2 ln(
2  
2  2 ) > 0
Which is true since all of the terms are greater than 0.
Proof. (Theorem 3)At rst lets show that in terms of total investment
EL12 > EL21
EL12 =

a2 ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ a1 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2a1 (r + 1  )
EL21 =

a1 ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2a1 (r + 1  )
Want to show
a2 ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ a1 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2a1 (r + 1  ) >

a1 ln

p(2r+1 )
(1 p)(1 )

+ a2 ln

2pr
(1 p)(1 )

a2a1 (r + 1  )
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
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a2 ln(
(2r + 1  )
2r| {z }
x
) + a1 ln(
2r
(2r + 1  )| {z }
1
x
) > 0
Dene
x =
(2r + 1  )
2r
then by following property of ln: lnx =   ln 1
x
the inequality is again reduced
to
(a2   a1) ln((2r + 1  )
2r
) > 0
which is true since by assumption a2 > a1
Secondly lets show that in terms of total investment EA12 > EA21
EA12 =

a2 ln

pr(2+2r )
(1 p)((2 )r 2+2)

+ ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a1

a2a1 (r    + 1)
EA21 =

a1 ln

pr(2+2r )
(1 p)((2 )r 2+2)

+ ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a2

a2a1 (r    + 1)
Want to show
a2 ln

pr(2+2r )
(1 p)((2 )r 2+2)

+ ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a1

a2a1 (r    + 1) >

a1 ln

pr(2+2r )
(1 p)((2 )r 2+2)

+ ln

2pr
(1 p)(2 )

a2

a2a1 (r    + 1)
by simplifying, rearranging and using the following property of ln; lnx  ln y =
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ln(x
y
) the inequality we want to show is reduced to
a1 ln(
2 ((2  ) r   2 + 2)
(2  ) (2r    + 2)| {z }
1
x
) + a2 ln(
(2  ) (2r    + 2)
((2  ) r   2 + 2) 2| {z }
x
) > 0
Dene x = (2 )(2r +2)
((2 )r 2+2)2 then by following property of ln: lnx =   ln 1x the
inequality is again reduced to
(a2   a1) ln( (2  ) (2r    + 2)
((2  ) r   2 + 2) 2) > 0
which is true since by assumption a2 > a1:
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Agent 1s equilibrium investment s1(vertical axis) as a function of his
risk aversion a1 (horizontal axis) under EA12 (black), EA21 (red), and EAsim
(blue) where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a2 = 10.
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Figure 2: Agent 1s equilibrium investment s1(vertical axis) as a function of his
risk aversion a1 (horizontal axis) under EL12 (black), EL21 (red), and ELsim
(blue) where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a2 = 10.
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Figure 3: Agent 2s equilibrium investment s2(vertical axis) as a function of his
risk aversion a2 (horizontal axis) under EA12 (black), EA21 (red), and EAsim
(blue) where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 5.
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Figure 4: Agent 2s equilibrium investment s2(vertical axis) as a function of his
risk aversion a2 (horizontal axis) under EL12 (black), EL21 (red), and ELsim
(blue) where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 5.
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Figure 5: Agent 1s equilibrium investment s1(vertical axis) as a function of
agent 2s risk aversion a2 (horizontal axis) under PRO(green solid line) EA12
(black solid line), EA21 (blue solid line), and EAsim (red solid line),EL12
(black dashed line), EA21 (blue dashed line), and EAsim (red dashed line)
where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 3.
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Figure 6: Agent 2s equilibrium investment s2(vertical axis) as a function of
his risk aversion a2 (horizontal axis) under PRO(green solid line) EA12 (black
solid line), EA21 (blue solid line), and EAsim (red solid line),EL12 (black
dashed line), EA21 (blue dashed line), and EAsim (red dashed line) where
r = 0:6; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 3.
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Figure 7: Agent 1s equilibrium utility (vertical axis) as a function of his risk
aversion a1(horizontal axis) underEA12(black solid line) EA21(red solid line)
EAsim (green solid line) EL 12(black dashed line), EL21 (red dashed line), and
ELsim (green dashed line) PRO(purple solid line) where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;
 = 0:7; and a2 = 10.
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Figure 8: Agent 2s equilibrium utility (vertical axis) as a function of his risk
aversion a2(horizontal axis) underEA12(black solid line) EA21(red solid line)
EAsim (green solid line) EL 12(black dashed line), EL21 (red dashed line), and
ELsim (green dashed line) PRO(purple solid line) where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;
 = 0:7; and a1 = 3.
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Figure 9: Both agents equilibrium utility (vertical axis) as a function of
agent 1s risk aversion a1(horizontal axis) underEA12(black) EA21(red) EAsim
(green). Where dashed lines represent agent 1 and solid lines represent agent
2 and where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 3.
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Figure 10: Both agents equilibrium utility (vertical axis) as a function of
agent 1s risk aversion a1(horizontal axis) underEL12(black) EL21(red) ELsim
(green). Where dashed lines represent agen 1 and solid lines represent agent
2 and where r = 0:6; p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 3.
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Figure 11: Total equilibrium utility (vertical axis) as a function of agent 2s
risk aversion a2(horizontal axis) underEA12(black solid line) EA21(red solid
line) EAsim (green solid line) EL 12(black dashed line), EL21 (red dashed
line), and ELsim (green dashed line) PRO(purple solid line) where r = 0:6;
p = 0:8;  = 0:7; and a1 = 3.
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